Showing posts with label Navalny. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Navalny. Show all posts

Wednesday, 8 June 2016

Do Russians need the "non-systemic opposition"?

June 8, 2016 - 
Mariya Lisitskaya, PolitRussia - 
Translated by J. Arnoldski



When people speak about the opposition, they usually have in mind the scandalous “white-ribboners” who are aching to be in government but aren’t let in. Such a statement can safely be called an illusion. Three major opposition parties are represented in parliament, and this raises some questions: What distinguishes the systemic opposition from the non-systemic opposition? Does the electorate need both? What are the prospects for them in the upcoming elections to the State Duma?

Perhaps it would be better to right off the bat reveal the intrigue by responding to the last question. And it doesn’t need to be sugar-coated. Although the main test for future people’s deputies still lies ahead, the general rehearsal took place in September last year. A single day of voting held in 84 regions of the country revealed more than a few patterns and gave good food for thought for political analysts and the parties involved in various polls. Some learned their lessons from this large-scale campaign, while others chose to turn a blind eye and ignore obvious things.

Nevertheless, the main result was that United Russia, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, “A Just Russia,” and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia will undoubtedly take the lower house of parliament in 2016. The non-systemic opposition, besides perhaps a few characters, will not appear in the parliament under any circumstances. 

At first glance, such a categorization may seem surprising. After all, almost all experts who analyzed the results of the vote in 2015 and the political situation in the country as a whole noted that the public demands a change in government in the country. The natural result was thus the victory of certain representatives of the systemic opposition which achieved convincing victories on the regional level. 

The head of the Center for Economic and Political Reforms, Nikolay Mironov, explained this thus:

“Society is concerned about the  economic crisis and does not fully trust the anti-crisis measures of the authorities. If the economic situation in the country does not improve by 2016 - and this is unlikely - then the demand for the system opposition to be in power, including on a coalition basis, will fully manifest itself in the State Duma elections in 2016.”

The general director of the Center of Political Information, Aleksey Mukhin, for example, praised the Communist Party of the Russian Federation:

“It should be recognized that the second winner in these elections were the communists. They almost completely utilized the protest potential that voters now have.”

The head of the board of the Foundation for the Development of Civil Society, Konstantin Kostin, noted the “stabile result” of the Zhirinovskites (supporters of the LDP) and praised “A Just Russia” which “in previous years took part in elections  extremely vaguely, but is now confirming its status as a parliamentary party.”

Experts were not divided over assessments of the non-systemic opposition. This opposition, in their opinion, “failed to show any significant results in the regions.” 

In regards to this, Nikolai Mironov emphasized:

“Despite the fact that voters are looking for a political alternative, for a number of reasons they only trust the systemic opposition.”

The general directory of the Moscow Region Analytical Center, the political scientist Aleksey Chadaev, pointed out one of the reasons for such. Studies conducted on behalf of the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion revealed a sad picture for the non-systemic opposition: outside of Moscow, the population of Russia knows nothing about it. As evidenced by the results of the study, 88% of Russians do not know what the non-systemic opposition is; 72% have never heard the expression, while only 4% were able to name one of its representatives without any prompting. Based on this, the Moscow Region Analytical Center concluded that the political capital of the non-systemic opposition is today zero. Voters lack awareness of its leaders, trust, and a positive assessment of its activities.

What conclusions have been drawn by parties based on all of this? Astonishingly enough, the greatest tension was felt in United Russia. Despite the victories it seized in the majority of regions, the ruling part has very well understood that the opposition is coming on its heels and is ready to take advantage of any of its mistakes. Political analysts have said the same.

Political analyst Aleksey Mukhin in particular believes:

“If after the Sunday vote the ruling party does not draw conclusions for itself, then its representation will certainly decline. This is first and foremost linked with the economic situation in the country. And the parliamentary opposition, I’m afraid, will be in the State Duma in significantly greater numbers than before.” 

The ruling party, however, has drawn conclusions for itself. Responding to public demand, it has begun to update a third of the leadership of United Russia and conducted a large-scale preliminary vote. It should be noted that in many regions the voting lists included not only the party’s own representatives, but also non-party figures including the independent representatives of the People’s Front for Russia. This is a win-win situation. The People’s Front has gathered a number of not only recognizable, but also authoritative people who care about affairs and are able to work. Most likely, the electorate will vote not so much for the party as for these concrete people.

The parliamentary opposition parties, receiving decent dividends from last year’s September elections, have not rested on their laurels. Grubbing over the administrative resources which prevent them from achieved better results, they have nevertheless actively participated in the election processes in the regions. The public perception of all parties is now wide open and the popular arena has not been overfilled. 

Frankly speaking, the systemic opposition has complained about administrative resources more with an eye and warning for the future. Hence the leader of “A Just Russia” Sergey Mironov’s immediate recognition that:

“We have noted a certain trend in regards to the feeling that more attention should be paid to the observance of the law: on the level of the Central Electoral Commission and on the level of, in fact, the administration of the president, very clear lessons have been given and very clear guidelines have been set so that elections are transparent.” 

If only the non-systemic opposition would hear the words of Sergey Mironov! But no. He who has not drawn any conclusion for himself from last year’s electoral failures has not learned anything. Or maybe the non-systemic opposition has quite different goals. Commenting on the situation on Kostroma, where police found a large sum in the HQ of the “Open Elections” observers, the political analyst Konstantin Kostin noted:

“Participating in elections was plan “B” for PARNAS, while plan “A” was organizing as many scandals it could imagine in order to present itself as a victim persecution. All these actions bordered on provocations.” 

Here and now perfectly understanding that they will not shine at all in the State Duma elections, the non-systemic opposition are merely biting each other, decrying the “bloody regime,” and are being despised by 85% of Russians who are increasingly registering the non-systemic opposition under the category of “morons.”

Recent events related to the classes between Aleksey Navally and Maksim Katz once again illustrate the inability of certain non-systemic opposition figures to cooperate even with their own like-minded peers. On the other hand, their ability to delve into someone else’s private life and expose it for everyone to see appears to be amazing.

The journalist Igor Maltsev, calling the non-systemic opposition “a box of spiders” expressed this in coarse form, but reflected the essence correctly.

In regards to verbal forms, the general director of the Council on National Strategy, Valery Khomyakov, was more correct. He also had no illusions as to the prospects for someone from the non-systemic opposition to get into the State Duma in a majority district. According to the political analyst, we still have to wait to see whether Yabloko and PARNAS will agree to supporting single candidates. He says:

“If there will be no such agreements, then speaking about the chances of one of them is absolutely senseless.”

What will a failure of the non-systemic opposition in elections to the State Duma mean? Most likely, nothing. They will “honestly” continue to fulfill their task which the political analyst Aleksey Mukhin has aptly described:

“This is a quite developed and sophisticated business system which allows Aleksey Navalny, Mikhail Kasyanov, and other characters of the non-systemic opposition to comfortably exist and continue their activities.”

Another thing is that the large scale of scandals and provocations will grow shallow. After all the dirty links and self-exposures, the sincere democrats are unlikely to go out to Bolotnaya Square. Hence why the director of the Center for Political Studies of the Russian Federation government’s Financial University, Pavel Selin, does not expect any recurrence of large-scale opposition protests after the elections. In his words, “this political agenda is not relevant” and socio-economic process needed for this “has not yet crystallized.” 


Let’s hope that it will be the representatives of the four parliamentary factions in the updated State Duma who will successfully “crystallize” this process in thinking first of all about the fate of the country and its population before their own political ambitions. 




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Sunday, 10 April 2016

British intelligence archives: Navalny is a MI6 & CIA agent

Translated by Ollie Richardson for Fort Russ
10th April, 2016




The former head of Boris Berezovsky's security service spoke about the relationship between famous blogger Alexey Navalny and the British MI6 intelligence service. He succeeded in exporting about 60 servers containing a huge amount of correspondence and documents.

"23rd December, 2007 - to the head of the Secret Intelligence Service A. Belt.

Report of agent Solomon about ending Navalny's verification and the assignment of the pseudonym "freedom".

Had a conversation over an encrypted communication channel between the employee and the CRS (SIS) and agent Solomon. The agent got approval for a confidential cooperation with Alexei Navalny. It was mentioned that it is necessary for Navalny to arrange financial support to carry out the tasks within the framework of special operation “Shiver” to undermine the existing constitutional order in the Russian Federation. Navalny has a nickname of "freedom", reads one of the documents.

Agent Solomon is the notorious William Browder, head of Hermitage Capital, inspirer of the Magnitsky act, and a person who made a fortune in Russia in the 90's.

Operation "Shiver" had already been developed at Langley in 1986. The documents were signed by then-CIA Director William Casey. The main goal of the project was to "change the constitutional and political system in Eastern Europe and the USSR".

Tasks are described in as much detail as possible: to change the political and constitutional state system, to acquire control over financial flows, and to extract assets from emerging economies.

The USSR has not existed for a quarter of a century, however, the project "Shiver" is still relevant.

"Browder spreads lies, and all his company is based solely on lies. Navalny is his student and successor of his ideas. They partly work together, working in parallel. They absolutely face the same direction," said Pavel Karpov, a former investigator of the Moscow Criminal Investigations Department. He is one of those who has stirred Browder's "snake nest" and opened schemes of tax evasion and illegal purchase of shares in Russia under the leadership of Hermitage Capital.

Here is an example of correspondence between Navalny and Browder in 2006:

"Let me very frankly formulate what I want to offer. I will teach you to grab the monsters of the Russian economy by the balls. Soon you will become a hero of the minority shareholders and can have their reputational capital. Probably, and political. In return I ask you to support me when my problems come out. Am I clear?" asks Browder to Navalny. "Your information in exchange for the loyalty of my potential. However, I'm afraid you banked on the wrong figure. I could have problems even in my party. There I seem to be a nationalist," — says Navalny.

Then, under the leadership of Browder, and with his financial support, the still unknown blogger opened the cycle of revelations. At the same time the scene appears banker Vladimir Ashurkov. He dealt with money matters for "revelatory activities".

"Agent "freedom" was acquainted with the first phase of the secret denunciation of the conviction of corruption and embezzlement of Russian state assets. To implement the first phase of the plan, agent "freedom" was funded to the amount of 100 million rubles. The first part of funds, 7 million rubles, will be transferred to our authorised representative of the Moscow Helsinki Group until January 26th. Agent A. Belt".

The activities of the Hermitage Capital in Moscow has been completely phased out as auditor Sergey Magnitsky was appointed to clean up any traces that remained.

"People say that he was Browder's lawyer. This is an outright lie! He was an accountant, who was engaged in tax evasion for Browder, i.e. registered companies through which money was withdrawn from. As I was told by Magnitsky  himself, these millions were withdrawn by his own chief, who, as I learned later, was Mr. Browder," recalls journalist Oleg Lurie.

When Magnitsky was arrested, Navalny wrote to Browder, "William, sincerely sorry. People get used to like those who suffer in our country  I'm not saying that the suffering of Sergei is your trump card, but the more these journalists and people will learn about this suffering, the less they will want to know what is happening".

Browder's goal was to create the maximum noise possible with information, however the situation abroad with the "legal auditor" responded little.

"20th September 2009. To the Director of Central Intelligence. 

A conversation between agent Solomon and an employee of MI6. 

Further growth of public resonance will be gone unless we make adjustments to the plans of our ongoing special events. In his message to the agent, based on information available for it, he noted the deteriorating health of Magnitsky. It was proposed to the agent, through authorized persons in the penitentiary system of Russia, to organize a disruption of medical assistance to Magnitsky. The deterioration of his health will be designated as a medical error that could lead to his death. Please pay special attention to this information", — stated the documents.

Magnitsky was literally sacrificed. In November 2009, he died in the hospital of the "Matrosskaya Tishina" detention facility, and Browder announced that the prisoner was tortured, he was also refused medical care. And then there was the "Magnitsky list".

Here is what is said in the secret documents about it:

 "January 23, 2010. Sash reports on a meeting with the agent "freedom", during which he gave the agent $300,000 for the upcoming program to support the "Magnitsky list" on social networks. The report of the agent Sash also said that the project is linked with the death of Sergei Magnitsky, and already in the early stages it greatly undermined the credibility of Russian citizens in the Russian judicial and law enforcement system. This leads to growing chaos in the Russian judicial and law enforcement system, a reduction of its credibility, and a reduction in the credibility of Vladimir Putin. Agent A. Belt".

All this time, Browder warned Navalny against political activity.

"We have our own tasks. Bill asks you to be careful. Urge you not to interfere in the electoral process — it is not your task. Monitoring, reporting — Yes. Protests — no," — said in his message.

Apparently, the situation has since changed.

It is noteworthy that the Skype accounts of Browder and Navalny, where they started talking in 2006, are still operational. But we failed to contact subscribers.




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