The Real History of the Islamic State and its Future Disintegration (Part 2)

November 30, 2015 -

Valentin Domogadsky, PolitRussia - 

Translated for Fort Russ by J. Arnoldski

Continued from Part 1

Sewing on the knee

The Baathists, who are today referred to as the “former officers of Saddam Hussein”, acted as a liaison between radical Islamists and Sunni tribes. From the moment of the American intervention in Iraq, Ibrahim al-Douri, the right hand of the late Iraqi “dictator”, led this category of resistance forces until his death.

During Saddam Hussein’s life, al-Douri held the post of secretary of the Baath party, and he was Hussein’s deputy in the Revolutionary Command Council, that is, he was the second man in the power hierarchy of Iraq, and the first in the party. It was Ibrahim who started the process of reviving Islam in the country in the ’90’s and conducted very delicate negotiations with the Shiite clergy and Arabian monarchs. Two decades later, this turned out to have a certain influence on the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq. 

In 2006, Ibrahim al-Douri, who at the time was the most wanted functionary of the dismantled regime, created the group “Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order” which already by the next year united the larger forces of Iraqi nationalists, including Islamic organizations. The new Baathist stricture was called the “High Command of Jihad and Liberation.” 

Ibrahim al-Douri, from the moment of the American invasion of Iraq, established relationship with the most influential groupings of the resistance movement, including radical Islamists. It was tis former deputy of Hussein who was the architect of an extremely fragile alliance between the Islamists from the Islamic State of Iraq and the tribal militias of the Sunni provinces. In general, the very fact of alliance between Baathists, Sunni tribes, and radical Islamists speaks to the organizational talents of al-Douri far more than any of his “biographers” since all of these forces had long existed in the conditions of a total war of “all against all.”

One of the unifying factors of these forces was official Baghdad’s political repression of “Baathists” and representatives of the Sunni elite. on the bases of their exclusive affiliation with the Baath party, thousands of officials, security officers, teachers, and doctors were dismissed and as a result joined the ranks of the future Islamic State. Parallel to this, representatives of Al-Sahwa were destroyed, the organization was disbanded, and many Sunni officials and sheikhs were arrested. 

Thus, the catalyst behind the process of unifying three antagonists in a single Islamic structure was not the propaganda of radical Islam as some political analysts say. The true reason for the conclusion of this alliance lies on the plane of the economic and political interests of all sides. 

As a result of the American intervention in Iraq, the only disadvantaged party was precisely the Arab-Sunni minority, which official Baghdad refused to include in the “government plough.” That is, after the withdrawal of American troops, the Kurds de-facto gained their autonomy with the opportunity to trade in circumvention of official Baghdad, and Baghdad itself was “occupied” by Shiites oriented towards Iran. The Sunni Arabs were deprived of many benefits and didn’t participate in any way in distribution processes.

“When comrades don’t agree”

Thus, the Islamic State, in both its original and present form, is a vivid illustration of what happens to “rats trapped in a corner.”...The whole system of the Islamic State was built on compromise which originally meant “partnership” for the sake of survival. Today, this is already for the sake of seizing the assets of competitors. 

In a nutshell, we have three “factions” within the Islamic State, each one of them with their own goal. It’s not difficult to guess that the Salafis lead the idea of constructing a Caliphate. The Baathists, as one might imagine, tend to strive for returning back to the status quo or, if so desired, riding the Islamists in conquering the territories of a new state formation. Here it is worth noting that the ideology of the Baathists is based on the principles of nationalism and, accordingly, the establishment of rule over Baghdad and the Kurdish territories included in the list of mandatory procedures for state-building. The least ambitious component of the Islamic State are the Bedouin tribes of Iraq, who are completely satisfied with their current position which is expressed in control over all assets in their residential areas. As the American General MacFarland noted rightly at the time: “these clans, as a country, have no friends, only interests.” 

The whole secret of the successful state-building of the Islamic State lies in the concept of “imperial expansion” as its educated is enlarged by territories based on the interests of local clans, tribes, and political or military forces. That is, the Islamic State simply gives local elites a “short cut to rule” demanding very little in return - taking the official oath, introducing a new tax system, carrying out some mobilization activities among young people, and integrating local industry into a unified system.

For the local elites who simply did not possess this in Iraq and Syria, the offer of full control over the “social sphere” and all of local business appears to be a ticket to a happy life. The Islamic State, in turn, solves the problem of control on the ground, which in its classical form is “smearing combat-ready forces” to the rear.

However, maintaining this balance between the Islamic State and local clans presents some difficulties which we mentioned not too long ago in the context of the Syrian crisis:

“The loyalty of all these little groupings and ‘regional division’ of large Islamist structures directly depends on the price offered and the situation at the front. If Islamists win, then loyalty is preserved. If they’re beat by government forces, then they’ll start to say: ‘we’re local, you forced us, we didn’t want to fight, but after all you understand.” Something similar can be observed in Donbass where, as it turns out, the most fierce fighting on the Ukrainian side was participated in by pacifists.”

And today, the future of the Islamic State is found under a big question mark which unites local successes just as government forces in Syria and Kurds (including Iraqi Kurds) who have begun to cut off the Caliphate from major transport corridors. Among other things, the unofficial ban on bombing the oil infrastructure of the Islamic State has been recently overturned, and this certainly makes the leaders of the Islamic State change their budget plan for the coming year. 

However, the leadership of the Islamic State has not only been hit at transport arteries and in the oil industry. The main blow has been inflicted on the interests of local business, that is, the interests of the very elites who collaborated with the Islamists with the aim of increasing their capital. In the conditions of a reduction of “raw” resources, the attractiveness of the Islamic State in the eyes of numerous tribes and clans starts to drop to zero. The growing possibility of someone losing his life in a bombardment is also included here. 

What the proponents of a complete physical extermination of everyone cooperating with the Islamists would not say is that the future of this conflict will be determined by including Sunni tribes in negotiations. Let us make a bold assumption that in the near future the local elite will be much more tractable, and will quite possibly be looking for contacts for negotiations. In this case, it is worth remembering the old and not quite politically correct formula: “An Arab cannot be bought, only rented.” It is time to change the tenant. 

The Real History of the Islamic State and its Future Disintegration (Part 1)

November 30, 2015 -

Valentin Domogadsky, PolitRussia - 

Translated for Fort Russ by J. Arnoldski

"On the prospects of a split in the Islamic State"

The Islamic State is often considered to be some kind of monolithic structure which unites under its banner exclusively religious fanatics from all over the world. It is argued that the number of Salafists (Islamic radicals) in the ranks of ISIS is equal to the payroll of fighters, officials, and leaders of the group.

On the bases of such appraisals, varying conclusion on the impossibility of liquidating the Islamic State are made, since its militants are driven by the ideology of radical Islam and this ideology, as is known, can only be replaced by another ideology. However, this informational picture is only partly true. 

The Islamic State just like any other military-political structure of a similar scale and exists exclusively thanks to following the principle of “checks and balances,” that is, through the achievement of a balance of interests of all participants. The latest news coming out of Iraq and Syria indirectly suggests that this fragile balance that has allowed to expand its territory has been disturbed.

From the “green international” to Iraqi Islamism

In the context of the topic under discussion, it would be wise to refresh our memory and remember how the far from most influential group during the time of the civil war in Iraq evolved into the largest and richest terrorist organization of our time.

It is widely known now that the Islamic State was established on the basis of the “Islamic State of Iraq” established in 2006 and transformed over time into the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.” However, the nature of the origin ISIS’ first prototype remains unknown to many.

The American intervention in Iraq, as is known, provoked not only the opening of a new regional branch of Al-Qaeda, but also a surge in terrorist activity in the country. The Jihadist Front against “occupiers and crusaders” opened dozens of terrorist groupings, and Al-Qaeda was not the most influential “rebel” force in the country. 

Its especial popularity among the local Sunni population and Islamic groupings of “Al-Qaeda in Iraq” had to do with its pathological cruelty and intolerance towards the “opponents” of its leader, the “Jordan butcher” al-Zarqawi. The fighters of Al-Qaeda in Iraq were not only for their resonating terrorist attacks against occupational forces and Shiites, but also against those Iraqi officials collaborating with the Americans. A particular feature of the terrorist practice of Al-Qaeda in Iraq was its absolute indifference to the victims of terrorist attacks. Thatis, if the liquidation of an official could cause serious casualties among the peaceful Sunni population, the attack still nonetheless took place.

One of the best researchers on terrorist activity in Iraq during the time of the American occupation is V.V. Kudelev, who estimated that during the first three years of the civil war, the hands of Islamists from Al-Qaeda in Iraq killed no less Sunnis than Shiites. This fact was repeatedly pointed out by Ayman al-Zawahiri (at the time the second man of Al-Qaeda in Pakistan) who called the “butcher of Jordan” to review his policy towards the local population. The appeal did not find an answer. 

However, the refusal of the leadership of Al-Qaeda to review policies in relation to the Sunni population sharply contrasted with the desire of the group to establish its monopoly on the territory of Iraq, which a priori was impossible as long as militants methods of struggle were practiced. AS a result, a “Solomonic solution” was found which put together an alliance of Islamists under a new guise.

Thus, in January 2006 the creation of the “Shrua Council of Mujahidin” was announced, which over the course of a year, in addition to Al-Qaeda in Iraq, was joined by many (more than 30) influential groupings (the Army of the Victorious Community, the Army of Conquerors, and the Troops of the Companions, and others). This gathering of a new “terrorist pool” culminated in the proclamation of the Islamic State of Iraq. It was headed by the predecessor of the current Caliph, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. 

This “administrated reform” resolved two of the most sharp problems of Al-Qaeda in Iraq. First of all, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, in setting the tone for the new structure, increased and multiplied its military strength and mobilization capability. Secondly, a major step towards monopolizing the jihadist movement in Iraq was made under the banner of a new grouping with more than 30 (at the time 50) organizations. What was also of more than little important was that Al-Qaeda in Iraq could “chill” the advocates of its competitors, quite rightly blaming a group of “otherness.” After the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq, the issue of dominance by foreigners in the ranks of Al-Qaeda in Iraq lost its relevance. 

The proclamation of the Islamic State of Iraq undoubtedly became one of the most fateful events for Iraq and the region as a whole. Thanks to “changing guises,” the jihadi-internationalists were able to attract local Islamists who enjoyed some support of Iraq’s Sunni population, which in turn allowed them to form a springboard for further “resistance.” The process of consolidating Islamist forces in the country was launched, which eventually culminated in the proclamation of the Islamic State.

The war for preferences 

A second component of the further Islamic State was made up of former antagonists from the “Green International” movement on the territory of Iraq, Sunni paramilitary units in the province of al-Anbar (and other provinces later on) who are better known under the name “Councils of Awakening” (“al-Sahwa”).

The emergence of this organization was due to the rejection by the Sunni population of Iraq of what to them was the foreign ideology of the Islamists of Al-Qaeda, which imposed tight restrictions on the local population in areas under its control. The conflict between the leadership of the Islamists and local tribes resulted in the creation of a militia with the active support of occupation forces and was in a short period of time able to squeeze out the militants of Al-Qaeda from their residential areas. 

The militants of the “Councils of Awakening” received not only weapons, but also financing expenses in the amount of 300 dollars from occupation forces, which by Iraqi standards is a quite decent amount. At the best of times, the membership of Al-Sahwa” reached 150,000 fighters. 

Over time, this structure acquired the status of a guarantor of the conditional autonomy of Sunni provinces, since Al-Sahwa divisions acted as the private militaries of local tribes and clans. The Councils of Awakening controlled key transportation hubs and industrial enterprises which the local elite exploited and lived off of. The high efficiency of this structure, coupled with a rapidly growing political weight of Sunni leaders, forced the United States and official Baghdad to promise local tribes and clans that they would be incorporated into state institutions. The main deal was the question of “legalizing” these Sunni paramilitary units. 

However, the distrust of Al-Sahwa by American forces, coupled with the chronic voluntarism of the Shiite prime minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Miliki, left negotiations at a crossroads, the result of which was that Sunni tribes were compelled to go for an alliance with radical Islamists. We can assume that this was exclusively for the purpose of attracting bargaining with the officials in Baghdad behind whom for not the first year stood Iran rather than Washington.

Continued in Part 2