Terrorists in Aktobe: An Attempt to Blow up Eurasia From Kazakhstan

Translated by Ollie Richardson for Fort Russ

6th June, 2016

RIA

Rostislav Ishchenko, columnist for MIA and "Russia Today"

On Sunday, unknown armed men attacked a gun shop and military compound in the Kazakh city of Aktobe, and tried to seize weapons. The attackers were neutralized, and the authorities imposed the "yellow" level of terrorist danger in the country.

Why the terrorists chose Aktobe

There are no obvious causes for this, it would seem. The President of the country Nursultan Nazarbayev has managed to create an effective state based on a relatively strong economic base. Over the last decade, despite all the difficulties and problems, the country has managed to maintain ethnic peace and general political stability.

But in the modern world, problems do not arise in those states that have real internal conditions, but those who are not lucky enough to be at the point of intersection of geopolitical interests of the players.

For example, the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya had been internally stable and economically successful. However, one fateful day some "rebels" (which were later recognized by the world community as Islamist militants, transferred from abroad) stormed a military compound in Benghazi and civil war ended in the complete destruction of the Libyan state.

The armed rebellion in Aktobe was a literal repetition of the start of the Libyan war, only it was unsuccessful. Islamists attacked gun shops and tried to seize military equipment. If they had succeeded, there is no doubt that, using the captured arsenal, they would have armed a small army and tried to create a "rebel government".

The format for the Libyan civil war is very good Aktobe. This is a large enough city to become the capital of the rebels. At the same time, it is remote from all the large centres of Kazakhstan. There is distance between it and the main group of the armed forces of Kazakhstan, which are mainly engaged in the guise of the troubled southern borders. However, the Kazakh army is very small compared to the huge size of the territory. It would be difficult to quickly transfer troops and to create a group sufficient for the suppression of the rebellion (if they managed to enter the phase of expansion).

Aktobe is an intersection of roads that allows volatile rebel troops to be deployed to the South, West, East, and North Kazakhstan, to just a hundred kilometers from the Russian border.

100 kilometers South, a half-hour drive in jihadist traditional "carts" (pickup trucks with machine guns) for which the Kazakh steppe is as accessible as the Libyan desert, is the Kandyagash railway junction.

A railway line passing through Aktobe also leads to the Russian border. By rail or highway from Aktobe to Orenburg is 300 kilometers. Directly across the steppe is half the time.

The border between Kazakhstan and Russia, as between the partners in the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) is open. Yes, if it was not, to cover thousands of kilometers of the steppe borders is not a trivial task. For this an army is needed.

Taking aim at Russia and China

Kazakhstan is not only one of the base members of the Union. The shortest path of transit of Chinese goods to Russia and further to Western Europe still runs through it – one of the most promising new branches of the New Silk Road, which should link together the Asian and European markets.

Kazakhstan is one of the main guarantors of stability in Central Asia along with Russia. Moreover, it is through the territory of Kazakhstan that Russia has access to the former Soviet Central Asian republics, including to its base in Tajikistan.

The Central Asian states of the South, experiencing pressure in the form of jihadists from Afghanistan, in the case of destabilization of Kazakhstan, find themselves trapped. Their border loses stability almost throughout its length (except for the Turkmen-Iranian), and they can only get help and support by air.

Thus, in case the insurgency in Aktobe is successful with minimal resources, almost at the expense of local opportunities, it will solve several strategic tasks.

Firstly, the internal conflict would be associated with the army of Kazakhstan, which no longer would be able to play a stabilizing role for south central Asia.

Secondly, it would have put at risk, and in the worst case, blown up Sino-Russian and Sino-European transit.

Thirdly, a continuous and open Russian-Kazakh border would give unlimited opportunities for the penetration of jihadist gangs to the territory of Russia. In turn, this would require Moscow to take urgent measures to ensure the military protection of the border. Russia would be forced to weaken its force in the Western direction and to concentrate a large number of troops to prevent a breakthrough by the jihadists on its own territory.

Given the mobility of the jihadists and the cheapness of their support (they mostly forage at the expense of local resources) from Moscow it would take a long time to tie down repeatedly redundant military forces and material resources against the small, but elusive opponent.

Fourthly, in the case of a minimally successful development of the rebellion, destabilization would threaten the whole of Central Asia. A huge black hole would have opened up on the southern borders of Russia (from Orenburg to the Indian ocean), devouring already scarce resources. Here, any quick closing would be impossible, and would have been a problem for decades.

Finally, such integration projects as the EEU, the SCO and CSTO would have come under threat.

Imagine that under the joint efforts of Russia and Kazakhstan, in the framework of the obligations under the CSTO, the rebellion would have been suppressed relatively quickly, and a large-scale destabilization of the region would have been avoided. But military cooperation between Moscow and Astana in Northern Kazakhstan, where there is a high percentage of the Russian population, would allow our Western "friends and partners" once again to begin to talk about interference in the internal affairs of neighboring states and to label it as an attempt to recreate the Soviet Union. They would attempt to sow distrust, if not between Moscow and Astana, between the Russian and Kazakh population of Kazakhstan, as well as strengthening the militant Russophobic hysteria of Eastern European bordering countries.

The rebellion in Syria has destabilized the entire Middle East. The rebellion in Libya has done the same in North Africa. Both the rebellion and the coup in Ukraine have created serious problems between Russia and the European Union. Against this background, the rebellion in Kazakhstan would complement the picture, plunging into chaos the entire center of Eurasia and completely severing economic and trade ties between Europe and Asia.

Against this background, the American projects of the Transatlantic and Transpacific free trade zones would have had no alternative proposals.

So I'm sure that in Aktobe we had to deal with the first, but not the last, attempt to start a civil war in a key country in Central Asia.

Kazakhstan's power structures have worked effectively enough, and it pleases. But it also means that the next attempt will be better prepared. So it is impossible to relax.

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European-Eurasian Integration Can Not Be Stopped, It Can Only Be Slowed Down

Expansion of the Customs Union of EurAsEC: Green - Customs Union; Red - canditates for CS; Yellow - potential candidates for CS

Rostislav Ishchenko for RIA Novosti

23 years after the liquidation of USSR and the establishment of CIS on December 8, 1991, we can conclude that the Commonwealth of Independent States - is now, in fact, a defunct project, says Rostislav Ishchenko.

Of course, politicians and diplomats will continue to talk about the huge potential of the Commonwealth, listing achievements, documents, agreements, treaties, summits and long-term plans. These are the rules. Rarely do the circumstances arrange in such a way that a much discussed, approved and adopted for implementation international project ends with the words: "This is it, the project is closed".

Usually, it happens quietly. This is how the Nabucco gas pipeline quietly perished. Quietly died the GUAM organization. It seems that the same fate awaits the CIS. It was not necessary to announce the decision, but to simply stop gathering at the summits. But then you have to maintain and finance the staff of the Commonwealth, but for what?

The technique worked. Immediately after the announcement of the creation of Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), the elimination of useless Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) was announced. A political Eurasian Union (EAU) will be created, and suddenly a Union state of Russia and Belarus becomes unnecessary (in any case, Alexander Lukashenko did not rule out such a possibility).

In fact, today the CIS looks like a memorial to post-Soviet integration, which most of the time was more like disintegration. If this structure was effective, it would not be necessary to develop the concept of multirate integration and a creation of the EurAsEC, Customs Union, EEU and even the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) on its basis.

The CIS at its creation was considered by optimists as a confederate state formation designed to consolidate the majority of former USSR republics under the new circumstances. Until August 1993 the United Armed Forces of the CIS still existed.

Theoretically, events could go in that direction, but only in theory. As practice and experience showed, disintegration capacity was not exhausted in 1991, and one cannot force his way against historical trends. Russia struggled with centrifugal tendencies for a decade. Only at the beginning of 2000's the situation at the core state of CIS has stabilized.

From 2004-2005 centripetal tendencies in Russian politics began to accumulate, and since 2010 they absolutely dominate not only in domestic politics but also in foreign.

Its own separatist movement threatened Kazakhstan. In Central Asia interrepublic territorial disputes overlapping with domestic standoff of certain ethnic groups and regional economic interests, has created a zone of permanent instability which produced several civil conflicts and carried a threat of inter-state armed conflicts, which were miraculously avoided.

In the Caucasus military coups were followed by civil wars, and civil wars - by conflicts between countries. There were two full-scale wars with participation (on opposite sides) of CIS member states: the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the war of 08.08.08.

Moldova broke apart after a civil war, practically losing Transnistria. In Ukraine the civil war is raging as we speak, Crimea has gone to Russia, Donbass is almost lost. Which other regions will be lost, and what will be left of Ukraine - no one knows.

This amorphous formation, members of which have various status (Ukraine is the co-founder of the CIS, but has not signed the Charter; the Charter hasn't been signed by Turkmenistan, and Ukraine and Russia have not ratified the Protocol to the Agreement on creation of the CIS from December 21st, 1991) and have no consensus about each other's boundaries - is the Commonwealth of Independent States.

After the war of 08.08.08. Georgia formally withdrew from the CIS, but have maintained its participation in almost all the agreements reached in its framework. It's as if Belgium withdrew from the EU, but would remain a member of Schengen, the Euro zone, etc. In turn, Ukraine, Turkmenistan, and occasionally other countries partially ratified various CIS documents, considering some of their rules acceptable, and others - not.

It is clear that an international organization cannot exist under such conditions. And it does not. For example, Ukraine is in no hurry to leave the CIS, although, it shouts at every turn that it has been invaded by Russia, precisely because the formal fact of exit, besides short-term PR aimed at the domestic audience, will provide nothing, at the time when there may be problems with many agreements formally bound to CIS, favorable for Ukraine. And a lack of single procedure does not guarantee Kiev, that it will be able to pull off the trick that worked for Georgia - to withdraw from the CIS.

In general, the situation has changed so much that the integration projects of Russia ceased to focus on the post-Soviet space and are focused on the entire Eurasia (EEU and EAU) and even on the whole world (BRICS). It is clear that the Eurasian integration projects are much more clearly defined, although the obstructionist position of the EU against its own interests (including not even development, but survival), not willing to leave the custody of the US, calls for adjustments, forcing to shift priorities to Asia and the Middle East.

However, in 2014 BRICS have demonstrated the ability for unified political (refusal to participate in the American pressure on Russia and indirect support of Moscow) and financial-economical (the decision on the establishment of the BRICS Bank and the beginning of the transition to national currencies in international settlements) actions.

In fact, the task of reintegration of the post-Soviet space, not fulfilled by the CIS is now solved at a different level. This space is just a part of a much larger Eurasian integration project. The hand stretched out by Russia over the heads of ambitious post-Soviet formations to China, Iran, Turkey, India is moving these countries beyond the established brackets, turning from limitrophes playing between civilizational projects on their frontier positions into an inner Eurasian formation which cannot exist without the participation outside of the Eurasian integration project.

Meanwhile Russia (because of the mentioned EU position) only failed in overcoming the frontier position of Ukraine, which is one of the main causes of the ongoing civil war. If Europe agreed to the compromise proposed in March by Russia, when the continuation of the political and economic merger between the EU and the CU (EEU) would be exchanged for the preservation of a unified federalized neutral Ukraine, -  and the problem of Kiev would be solved as well as the problem of Central Asia as a result of the Russian-Chinese military-political and financial-economic integration. Inside a dynamically integrating European-Eurasian Union, Ukraine would simply lose the space for maneuver, and its elites would loose the ability to speculate with geopolitical choices. There would be only one choice.

However, despite the increase in confrontational rhetoric the point of no return has not been passed in Russia's and EU relationship, even though it is already very close. The most important thing is that regardless of the position of the European Union, the Eurasian integration cannot be stopped, it is only possible to slow down its Western direction.

However, neither the US can further support the financial and economic basis of the European Union nor the European economy is able to provide sufficient resource base to maintain unity.

Thus, the only question is whether the EU will join the Eurasian project at once and entirely, or gradually and in parts. The first would be preferable.

As for the CIS, since the moment when the face off between Moscow and Brussels for Ukraine has transformed into a face off between Washington and Moscow for the EU, the CIS as a political mechanism finally outlived its usefulness. Now it's only a sinecure for the apparatus providing periodic summits of presidents and prime ministers to discuss a priori impossible, or already resolved in the framework of other integration projects, questions.

Today CIS - is only an image for the media, a manger for a small number of bureaucrats and a cause for "expert opinions".

Translated by Kristina Rus for FortRuss.blogspot.com

Russia's Ideological Mastermind Alexander Dugin explained by Michael Millerman

On The Agenda with Steve Paikin, Michael Millerman discusses the philosophy of Alexander Dugin and its influence on Vladimir Putin and contemporary Russian geopolitics. It’s a wide-ranging interview that covers Dugin’s theory of Eurasianism, his critique of the West and liberal democracy, the defense of Russia as a unique, non-Western civilization in its own right, the compatibility of Dugin’s anti-communism with the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical catastrophe, the difference between Western multiculturalism and the kind of multicivilizational diversity that Dugin advocates, and much more. Watch the full interview below.

Michael Millerman co-translated Dugin’s The Fourth Political Theory (Arktos, 2012). You can read more of his writing in the TELOSscope archives.